The pan-European order at the crossroads: three principles for a new beginning by Kaim, Markus et al.
www.ssoar.info
The pan-European order at the crossroads: three
principles for a new beginning
Kaim, Markus; Maull, Hanns W.; Westphal, Kirsten
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Stellungnahme / comment
Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP)
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Kaim, M., Maull, H. W., & Westphal, K. (2015). The pan-European order at the crossroads: three principles for a
new beginning. (SWP Comment, 18/2015). Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik -SWP- Deutsches Institut für
Internationale Politik und Sicherheit. https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-425796
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer Deposit-Lizenz (Keine
Weiterverbreitung - keine Bearbeitung) zur Verfügung gestellt.
Gewährt wird ein nicht exklusives, nicht übertragbares,
persönliches und beschränktes Recht auf Nutzung dieses
Dokuments. Dieses Dokument ist ausschließlich für
den persönlichen, nicht-kommerziellen Gebrauch bestimmt.
Auf sämtlichen Kopien dieses Dokuments müssen alle
Urheberrechtshinweise und sonstigen Hinweise auf gesetzlichen
Schutz beibehalten werden. Sie dürfen dieses Dokument
nicht in irgendeiner Weise abändern, noch dürfen Sie
dieses Dokument für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke
vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, aufführen, vertreiben oder
anderweitig nutzen.
Mit der Verwendung dieses Dokuments erkennen Sie die
Nutzungsbedingungen an.
Terms of use:
This document is made available under Deposit Licence (No
Redistribution - no modifications). We grant a non-exclusive, non-
transferable, individual and limited right to using this document.
This document is solely intended for your personal, non-
commercial use. All of the copies of this documents must retain
all copyright information and other information regarding legal
protection. You are not allowed to alter this document in any
way, to copy it for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the
document in public, to perform, distribute or otherwise use the
document in public.
By using this particular document, you accept the above-stated
conditions of use.
 Stiftung  
Wissenschaft und 
Politik 
German Institute  
for International and 
Security Affairs 
 
SW
P
 C
om
m
en
ts
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
The Pan-European Order at the Crossroads: 
Three Principles for a New Beginning 
Markus Kaim, Hanns W. Maull and Kirsten Westphal 
The year 2014 confronted European policy-makers with a qualitatively altered situation. 
For the first time in many years an interstate conflict in Europe – manifested as an 
inner-state conflict – is being resolved by military means. Persistent uncertainty and a 
growing potential for conflict are the new realities the European Union (EU) must face 
– in its eastern neighborhood as well as in the Mediterranean region. This neighborhood 
also holds major strategic significance for the supply of energy to Europe. In order to 
limit the risks, it is necessary to define and construct a new pan-European order – based 
on existing conditions – that can rein in the potential for conflict, ensure greater pre-
dictability and build new trust. Germany should use its OSCE chairmanship in 2016 
to initiate negotiations to this effect along the lines of new principles, with a view to 
establishing a pan-European order with a strong energy component as its core. 
 
By annexing Crimea and destabilizing east-
ern Ukraine, Russia has violated fundamen-
tal principles of the overarching European 
order: As is becoming apparent, two diver-
gent and in many regards incompatible 
ideas of order are in competition. And 
nowhere do the fault-lines converge more 
clearly and painfully than in Ukraine. 
With its approach to international order, 
the current Russian leadership has laid 
claim to exclusive political zones of influ-
ence and the right to intervene in the do-
mestic affairs of other countries. Russia 
aims to protect these zones of influence 
through the Eurasian Economic Union 
(EEU). Launched on 1 January 2015, the 
EEU is based on the model of – and con-
ceived as a counterweight to – the Euro-
pean Union. Domestically, this project 
is driven by “managed democracy”, an 
authoritarian system rooted in a pan-Rus-
sian nationalism that in political and cul-
tural terms follows its own special path 
between Asia and Europe and claims for 
itself a leading role in “Eurasia”. Economic 
policy is increasingly dominated by protec-
tionism; the state regularly interferes in 
economic processes, and the EEU is being 
conducted as a Russian integration project. 
The Western international order frame-
work is based on the principles of expand-
ing and consolidating the EU and NATO. In 
this framework, the EU first tried to stabil-
ize its periphery by attempting to export 
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the constitutional, societal and economic 
order of Central Europe to the eastern and 
southern parts of the continent. After the 
turn of the century, this policy was also 
conducted via the new member states as 
part of Europe’s neighborhood policy. 
The (transformation) policy of the EU was 
focused on a ring of stable, democratizing 
and economically prospering countries in 
the eastern and southern neighborhood. 
The Ukraine crisis is only the most visible 
sign that the fundamental assumptions on 
which this policy is based are being called 
into question, and that the policy is per-
ceived by Russia as a competitive project. 
Consequently, the dispute between Europe 
and Russia has an increasingly deleterious 
effect on pan-European energy relations. 
The integration competition between 
Russia and the EU (as well as NATO) creates 
not only new fault-lines but also a security 
vacuum for those countries that lie between 
the spheres of domination of the two pro-
tagonists. An overarching new European 
order would therefore be desirable to safe-
guard the security and stability of these 
countries internationally. But fundamental 
security and energy considerations also 
make new efforts to construct a new pan-
European order imperative: The remaining 
weapons stockpiles, growing mistrust, old 
enemy stereotypes and new nationalism as 
well as the unpredictability of Russian policy 
all constitute dangerous risks on the periph-
ery of the European Union. There is an im-
mediate danger of further escalation. Fur-
thermore, security challenges are coupled 
with energy supply risks in the important 
transit and producing countries. 
In some respects, the challenge of setting 
up or re-establishing a pan-European order 
resembles that of the 1950s, when the Soviet 
Union sought acknowledgement of the 
territorial status quo and legitimation of 
its influence in Europe and to this end pro-
posed convoking a pan-European security 
conference. The strategy of the West that 
permitted it to embrace this proposal was 
formulated in NATO’s Harmel Report of 
1967. The report defined the two central 
components of Western strategy during 
that era: defense through deterrence, and 
détente. Negotiations between East and 
West (along with the participation of the 
neutral countries in Europe) in the frame-
work of the Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) produced the 
first codified and institutionally enshrined 
pan-European order since 1945. This politi-
cal compromise, non-binding in terms of 
international law, defined a modus vivendi 
between two diametrically opposed ideas 
of political order that were in competition 
with each other. In three baskets, guide-
lines governing security, economic relations 
and cultural and human relations were 
drafted. This approach made it possible 
to develop relatively balanced economic 
relations based on Russian raw material 
exports and the import of Western indus-
trial goods and comestibles, thereby sup-
porting détente efforts economically. Energy 
relations played the most important role 
in this system, particularly the export and 
transit of Russian petroleum and natural 
gas to Western Europe. 
The House of Europe between 
Aspiration and Reality 
The end of the division of Germany and 
Europe presented an opportunity to estab-
lish a new pan-European order. The most 
important document in this context was 
the Charter of Paris of 1990, which was 
developed and adopted in the framework 
of the CSCE. Its main principles were com-
prehensive economic, political and societal 
cooperation among all the countries of 
Europe on the basis of liberal democracy 
and market economy in a henceforth united, 
undivided Europe. The security and un-
fettered sovereignty of the state internally  
 
Papers addressing the challenges of inter-
national order policy will be published 
at irregular intervals under the title 
“The Future of International Order”.  
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and externally, as well as the inviolability 
of (external) borders, faded into the back-
ground. Instead, cooperation in the “shared 
house of Europe” was henceforth to be built 
on economic and political development and 
transformation based on shared values – and 
thus also on “internal affairs”. Following this 
new conception of order, the CSCE trans-
formed itself into the OSCE, the Organiza-
tion for Security and Cooperation in Europe. 
In terms of security policy, however, this 
new concept of pan-European order was 
problematic in a number of ways. First, in 
the course of the 1990s the area fragmented 
into solid market-economy democracies 
on the one hand and fragile transformation 
countries on the other. Burdened by sub-
stantially less favorable conditions, the 
latter found themselves involved in com-
plex transformation processes. The politi-
cal, economic and societal transformation 
paths took diverging routes; in the former 
Eastern bloc states, but also in the Mediter-
ranean region, the resulting state struc-
tures were to some extent inadequate. 
Second, the assumption that the entire 
European area stood on a foundation of 
shared values quickly turned out to be 
illusory, for the breakup of the Soviet 
Union sparked the formation of a series 
of new, independent successor states with 
predominantly authoritarian regimes. 
Third, in this context numerous territorial 
conflicts arose within the formerly existent 
borders, which were often settled violently. 
Fourth, important elements of the Cold 
War order remained intact as a “legacy” 
that had to be incorporated into the new 
order. This was true for the “hardware” – 
the extensive weapons stockpiles of the 
Cold War and the institutions of the West-
ern defense alliance, NATO – as well as the 
“software” of traditional attitudes, percep-
tions and enemy stereotypes. 
Energy and economic relations, which 
during the East-West conflict had substan-
tially helped to ease tensions, underwent a 
very similar development. On the surface, 
energy relations followed the paradigm of 
interdependence and growing integration 
with the aim of creating a common eco-
nomic area. But in the 1990s the Western 
European side was increasingly influenced 
by the neoliberal economic philosophy of 
the Reagan-Thatcher era. In addition, the 
energy markets in that decade were shaped 
by low oil prices and excess supply. The 
consumer nations dictated the rules of the 
market. This was also reflected in the inter-
national rules enshrined in the European 
Energy Charter (1991), particularly in the 
documents of the Energy Charter Treaty 
(ECT) (signed 1994, in force since 1998). 
Russia, too, propagated a common 
energy area, but one based on close entre-
preneurial alliances throughout the entire 
supply chain – from the oil well, via the 
pipelines, to the final consumer. That stood 
in diametrical opposition to the spirit of 
competition and decartelization. 
After the turn of the century the inter-
national market environment changed due 
to supply shortages and rising energy prices. 
Increasingly, developments in the energy 
market began to diverge from the princi-
ples of the energy policy system. The first 
cracks appeared in 2003, when the Yukos 
Oil Company, owned by politically motivat-
ed oligarch Mikhail Khodorkovsky, was 
broken up and allocated largely to Rosneft, 
a Russian state-owned company. In response, 
after having successfully expanded east-
ward, the EU increasingly resorted to ex-
porting its acquis communautaire in order 
to expand its internal market and assert 
its principles, thus making the EU’s trans-
formative aspirations in Eastern Europe 
were even more explicit. One of the vehicles 
for this policy was the European Energy 
Community, to which the Western Balkan 
nations and Ukraine acceded. 
In 2009, Russia withdrew from the pro-
visional application of the Energy Charter 
Treaty. As an alternative, then Russian 
president Dmitry Medvedev proposed an 
international energy convention, but this 
proposal was not embraced by the EU. 
In 2015, the Energy Charter process with 
Russia is practically at a dead-end. More-
over, by 2009 at latest commercial economic 
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energy relations between Russia and the 
EU had also entered rough waters with 
the adoption of the Third Internal Energy 
Market Package. Previously, energy rela-
tions were based on corresponding eco-
nomic and political interests, long-term 
contracts and complementary business 
models (sometimes resulting in bilateral 
monopolies). Instead of the long-term gas 
trade arrangements of the past, the EU 
shifted to a liberalized, competitive in-
ternal market based on spot and short-term 
transactions. At the same time, the long-
term predictability of future gas and oil 
consumption was undermined by EU’s 
targets in the areas of climate protection, 
renewable energies and energy efficiency. 
This increases uncertainty about future 
needs for natural gas and oil imports. 
The EU’s reasons for proceeding in this 
manner are completely understandable 
and legitimate. But its actions ultimately 
changed the market and the conditions 
for energy policy cooperation with supplier 
countries like Russia. The commercial dis-
putes that grew out of the various market 
models remained unresolved, particularly 
in the areas of gas trade and transport, 
because the deterioration of political rela-
tions made it difficult to find compromise 
solutions. In the Mediterranean, Turkey and 
the Caspian region, regulatory attempts 
failed, as did large EU infrastructure projects 
such as the Mediterranean Solar Plan or the 
Nabucco pipeline. Consequently, in 2015 
the region is lacking the regulatory frame-
work necessary to govern and structure 
energy relations among the most important 
transit countries – Belarus, Ukraine and 
Turkey – or with the producer countries, 
Russia, Azerbaijan and Algeria. 
During the East-West system conflict, 
Europe managed to progress from political 
division towards a pan-European order that 
regulated interstate conduct and facilitated 
cooperation. The decisive preconditions for 
this transition included a willingness to 
acknowledge realities; interest in economic 
cooperation; and the political will to find a 
modus vivendi based on common security 
and economic interests. By the same token, 
the pan-European order of Paris disintegrated 
because it failed to acknowledge important 
realities (e.g. it ignored the weakness of na-
tional structures in the transformation coun-
tries as well as the political orientation of 
their old elites) and because the willingness 
to cooperate was insufficiently developed. 
2015 and a Way out of Escalation: 
New Principles and Old Baskets 
As was the case during the East-West con-
flict, today, too, the continent lacks a 
sufficiently binding pan-European order. 
This entails great security risks but also 
untapped potential for economic coopera-
tion, from which all those involved – the 
EU, Russia, and other members of the EEU 
and the Eastern European states situated 
between the two camps – could benefit. At 
the same time it is obvious that (energy) 
security on the European continent will 
be difficult to achieve without – and impos-
sible to achieve against – Moscow. What is 
needed in all conflicts is a new approach to 
international order policy based on security 
and cooperation. 
The strategic goal of German foreign 
policy in the current situation should be to 
initiate a pan-European negotiation process 
along the lines of the Harmel Report. This 
initiative must affirm the regulatory instru-
ments that have been developed, reactivate 
the existing – but unused – instruments, 
and finally add new ones (OSCE 2.0). 
In light of the way Western policy is per-
ceived in Moscow – as described above – it is 
illusory to believe that Russia could resume 
a cooperative stance in its dealings with 
NATO, the EU, and its member states any-
time soon without the West having to pay a 
political price. Against the backdrop of the 
violent conflict between Kiev and Moscow – 
or pro-Russian militias – in eastern Ukraine, 
the first aim of German foreign policy 
should be to bring about a peaceful coexist-
ence and “co-evolution” between (in short) 
Western ideas of domestic political order 
and those of Russia. 
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Following this line of reasoning, we pro-
pose as the first principle for the path to 
establishing a renewed pan-European order, 
that the precept of the inviolability of 
national territory should be broadened to 
include a political component: the incon-
testability of the internal political order. 
The model would be the kind of policy 
which Germany has pursued vis-à-vis other 
authoritarian regimes such as that of the 
People’s Republic of China – regimes that 
are criticized for the internal constitution 
of the states they govern but with whom 
cooperation is essential due to their status 
and influence in international affairs. 
Moscow evidently believes that the ulti-
mate goal of Western policy is to topple 
President Putin and transform Russia’s 
political order by means of a “color revo-
lution”. On many occasions, both President 
Putin himself and his Foreign Minister 
Sergey Lavrov have accused the West of 
trying to foment regime change in Russia. 
Russia’s new military doctrine, presented 
by Putin in December 2014, is based on a 
similar threat analysis. 
For Western governments, accepting the 
existing political orders in Eastern Europe 
even if they fail to comply with the prin-
ciples of the Paris Charter would limit their 
scope of action: They would have to refrain 
from demanding and actively promoting 
democratic changes in the political systems 
of the countries of the post-Soviet region 
and adjust their conduct accordingly. In 
practice, this will need to be done with 
good judgment and in a nuanced way. 
For example, it was certainly right of the 
foreign ministers of Poland, France and 
Germany to assert their influence in Kiev in 
February 2014 in order to clinch an agree-
ment between the Ukrainian government 
and the opposition. Earlier visits to the 
Euromaidan by members of Western gov-
ernments clearly aimed at supporting the 
opposition, in contrast, were not compat-
ible with the broadened principle of the 
inviolability of internal political orders. 
Recognizing these orders as incontestable 
(but not as inalterable) would be tantamount 
to a willingness to tolerate all existing 
regimes in Europe based on the principle 
of reciprocity. Such recognition would thus 
apply not only to Russia but also to coun-
tries such as Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia, 
but also Belarus. The broadened principle 
would imply that state actors would be pro-
hibited from interfering in the domestic 
affairs of a country against that country’s 
will – though intergovernmental coopera-
tion, even in sensitive areas, would still be 
possible if consented to by both states. These 
rules would apply to all countries involved; 
they would therefore patently also affect 
any actions undertaken by Russia aimed at 
subverting Western governments. The rec-
ognition of the respective political orders 
would merely broaden – not replace – the 
old principle of the inviolability of national 
borders. Thus, it would not predetermine the 
settlement of internal territorial conflicts 
(such as those involving Crimea, Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh, or 
Transnistria), the resolution of which, in 
accordance with the inviolability of borders, 
would remain on the political agenda. 
In dealing with the NATO-Russia Found-
ing Act, the North Atlantic Alliance pro-
vided a model for “strategically modifying” 
an established principle: At their summit 
meeting in September 2014, the heads of 
state and government consciously refrained 
from rescinding the Founding Act, choos-
ing instead to “suspend” it in view of the 
fact that the basic conditions necessary 
for its application are currently not given. 
Similarly, the West should not rescind the 
obligation to hold free and fair elections, 
observe the rule of law and promote democ-
racy – obligations that exist for the internal 
constitution of the countries of the pan-
European area. The prospect of cooperation 
based on universally shared values has to 
be kept open for the future. In this way, all 
those involved can later build or rebuild on 
these principles. Thus, the part of the “Paris 
consensus” (following the Paris Charter) 
that governs the interstate conduct of the 
signatory states would remain intact: The 
inviolability of the national territories of 
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European states would not be called into 
question, and the division of Europe into 
zones of influence dominated by individual 
countries would not be accepted. Indeed, 
there is no need to renounce this status quo. 
In keeping with this principle, the entire 
sanctions regime would have to be reviewed 
in order to determine to what extent sanc-
tions against countries of the post-Soviet 
region have been imposed not in order to 
censure any specific foreign policy conduct 
but rather to challenge the internal consti-
tution of the country, such as that of Bela-
rus. The EU could send a political signal to 
this effect by suspending sanctions of this 
nature, at least partially or for a limited 
period of time. 
In the framework of the second princi-
ple, Western policy towards the periphery 
of the EU should concentrate on (re-) estab-
lishing and further developing effective 
statehood. Functioning statehood consti-
tutes an essential precondition for success-
ful modernization and common welfare. 
The acute deficiencies in governmental 
effectiveness in Ukraine, but also in Russia, 
have from the outset played an important 
role in the genesis of the current crisis. 
Effective statehood can be developed and 
promoted, for example by fighting corrup-
tion, building a functioning health system 
and competent administration, and pro-
viding transport and energy infrastructure. 
Addressing these and other prominent 
deficiencies is not only in the interest of 
each individual country but also in the 
common interest of all the countries of 
the Euro-Atlantic region. 
One cannot, of course, completely sepa-
rate the activities of a state from its under-
lying model of political order; some activi-
ties, such as the organization of the media 
landscape or political parties, are politically 
highly sensitive and thus not suited to the 
type of cooperation envisaged here. But 
given sufficient interest, there should also 
be many projects and activities beyond that 
inner circle of the political arena described 
above that are neutral enough to lend them-
selves to cooperation. In all cases the goal 
should be to work together to increase the 
effectiveness of state structures. 
The third principle implies sober prag-
matism in economic relations, which should 
serve to stabilize energy relations and facili-
tate a fair balance of interests between the 
EU and Russia. A realistic assessment of the 
respective interests is an essential precondi-
tion for this approach. Developments in the 
energy market must be taken into account. 
Russia’s oil, gas, coal and nuclear fuel deliv-
eries are fundamental for the economic 
prosperity of Europe as long as the present 
energy system remains dependent largely 
on fossil fuels (and nuclear energy). The 
question of whether to maintain sanctions 
depends on the course the conflict takes 
and is therefore to some extent removed 
from economic rationality. Nevertheless, a 
policy shift aimed at upgrading long-term 
trade relations and strengthening stable 
business and contract models for transport 
and delivery could help to defuse conflicts 
and open up new prospects for political 
cooperation. Similar models are already 
under discussion for the supplier countries 
in the Caspian and Mediterranean regions. 
Russia must not be sidelined. Long-term 
planning security is also of great impor-
tance to the transit countries. 
It is clear from this analysis that what 
is needed is an overarching regulatory 
framework that adequately takes into 
account the interests of the EU as well as 
the transit countries and the energy sup-
pliers and facilitates future cooperation. 
But the dilemma is that in 2015 these 
processes have come to a standstill and the 
communication channels used to maintain 
dialogue with Russia have been closed. An 
economic restart in energy relations there-
fore also requires a political reordering. 
The goal should be to create a “symmetry 
of asymmetries”, i.e. to confine and balance 
the respective national dependencies in a 
manner that keeps the implicit political 
vulnerabilities within reasonable limits. 
In the EU, practicing inward solidarity 
is the ideal way to liberate member states 
from unreasonable supplier dependence. 
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The path that has already been taken 
towards creating an energy union aimed 
at strengthening the internal market and 
expanding interstate networks should be 
pursued vigorously. In order for this project 
to advance, all member states must imple-
ment the existing internal market packages. 
Furthermore, the stress tests conducted in 
2014 clearly demonstrate the added value 
of cooperation in the EU internal market 
when it comes to increasing security of 
supply. In order to be prepared for crisis 
situations, the durability of the EU energy 
network should be strengthened and emer-
gency mechanisms better coordinated. On 
the other hand, the costs and benefits of 
possible measures should be considered 
carefully and climate and energy policy 
alternatives taken into account. In the end, 
saving energy, strengthening emergency 
mechanisms and prudently expanding 
renewable energies yields greater dividends 
than diversifying supply sources and con-
structing new transport routes. Not only 
are the latter costly; in some cases they 
merely shift geopolitical risks instead of 
reducing them. 
Exporting the acquis communautaire 
beyond the energy community, in contrast, 
should not be a primary goal. In order to 
avoid creating new rifts or widening the 
gap between supplier, transit and buyer 
countries, maintaining a balance of inter-
ests should be the guiding principle. Efforts 
to achieve such a balance should lead to 
negotiations over common rules of play to 
facilitate cross-border trade, access to infra-
structure and common energy projects. A 
mid-term political goal would be to strive 
for the establishment of international 
guidelines on investment, trade and transit 
comparable with those laid down in the 
Energy Charter Treaty. The problem is 
that for the time being the Energy Charter 
process cannot be used for this purpose 
anymore: as explained above, it now carries 
too much political baggage. Alternatively, 
negotiations could be held in the United 
Nations Economic Commission for Europe 
(UNECE), which also addresses regulatory 
issues. Expanded and strengthened energy 
cooperation should take place in the frame-
work of the OSCE. The organization has 
already defined the protection of strategic 
infrastructure and the construction of sus-
tainable energy systems as areas of activity. 
In this field, which touches on hard and 
soft security interests, pan-European co-
operation could also be promoted as a con-
tribution to confidence-building. This would 
also make it possible to reopen communi-
cation channels with Russia over time. The 
second principle addressed above – streng-
thening effective statehood – also plays an 
important role in modernizing infrastruc-
ture and increasing energy efficiency. 
Conclusions and Policy 
Recommendations 
Based on the elements outlined here, it 
might be possible to revive a negotiating 
process towards a reconstituted European 
order. To do so would require recognition 
of shared interests, notably with regard to 
the security risks resulting from present 
tensions. It would also have to build on a 
shared commitment to ideological disarma-
ment, acceptance of the political regimes 
in place, and a willingness to work together 
in building effective statehood and a new 
long-term energy system for all of Europe 
based on a symmetry of asymmetries. The 
mere initiation of such a process would be 
an important step forward. In line with the 
principles explained above and with an eye 
to the OSCE chairmanship in 2016, German 
foreign policy should: 
 conduct a self-critical debate (also with 
Western allies) about what elements of 
the pan-European order – above all in the 
area of confidence and security-building 
measures – have been inadequately put 
to use or not used at all over the past 
several years. Not everything has to be 
reinvented, but many things could be 
rediscovered. 
 work towards initiating a negotiation 
process among all the European states 
with the goal of defining the fundamen-
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tals of a revitalized and amended pan-
European order and embedding these 
in a renewed OSCE (OSCE 2.0). 
 within the framework of these negotia-
tions, and in line with the principles, 
place emphasis on the first two of the 
three baskets of the CSCE process (i.e., 
security and economic cooperation); and 
 within the framework of the second 
basket, strengthen energy cooperation 
and work towards common long-term 
and stable parameters in order to facili-
tate a balance of interests among the 
countries concerned. 
The implementation of these principles 
within the framework of an OSCE 2.0 is cer-
tain to require a realignment of the EU’s 
foreign relations with both its eastern and 
southern neighbors. Europe would have to 
substantially reduce its ambitious efforts 
to export its own political, economic and 
societal order to its neighborhood. Ger-
many and Europe will undoubtedly find it 
difficult to pay this high price. But securing 
a lasting peaceful coexistence in the pan-
European region is worth the effort. 
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